This article makes three main claims: (1) that the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, properly understood, has no normative or political implications whatsoever; (2) that scholars with otherwise dramatically conflicting interpretations of Wittgenstein should nonetheless all agree with this conclusion; and (3) that understanding the (non-) implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy helps to answer the two motivating questions of the literature on value pluralismwhether values are (or can be) plural (yes), and whether value pluralism leads to, requires, or reveals some particular normative or political response (no). The main line of dispute is whether the theories laid out in the earlier and later works are profoundly similar or profoundly different. Here, too, I make no claim to resolving this controversy or even to adding anything to it. In this article, I will present the two theories as being significantly different, for two reasons: first, the theories present themselves that way to me, though I acknowledge that there are many similarities between the earlier and the later work; second, because emphasizing the differences between the theories makes it easier to explicate the later theory quickly for non-specialists.
intended his book to put forward a theory about how language works, this passage is in essence a reminder that the theory is intended to get us to grasp something that cannot be directly said (because saying it would require an Archimedean point outside of language from which to see the whole picture -more below), and that therefore the preceding text has been partially defective if evaluated by its own standards. On the view that the book was intended primarily as therapy, this passage is the crux of the entire text, since it (hopefully) leads to the recognition that what had appeared to be a compelling theory of language (one that deftly revealed the inner contradictions of the other contending theories and showed why any alternative would be grounded in absurdity) is itself absurd, since it has gained its ostensible victory only by violating its own rules (by saying something that cannot sensibly be said), thereby helping us see the futility of theorizing about language at that would-be-universal level of abstraction.
These two positions both have eloquent and well-respected partisans, and efforts to chart a middle path between them have come under strong criticism. 9 I wish to state plainly that I have nothing to add to this debate, and that I have no pretensions to resolving it. In this article, I will discuss Wittgenstein's work as if it were intended to convey a theory (or two) about language, for two reasons: first, that is how the work presents itself to me, even after seriously considering the arguments of the therapeutic school; second, the focus of this article is the literature on the normative/political significance of Wittgenstein's work, and most of that literature (though not all, as I discuss below) takes the theory approach to interpretation. However, one main contention of this article is that the theoretical and therapeutic schools ought to converge in their assessments of the normative and political significance of Wittgenstein's writings, so that while my approach is theoretical, my conclusions are also therapeutic. On the view argued below, both schools ought to conclude that Wittgenstein's work has no normative or political consequences whatsoever.
A second main contention of this article is that coming to a correct understanding about the normative and political implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy will shed some much-needed light on the problem of value pluralism. Since the publication of Isaiah
Berlin's celebrated essay 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in 1958, political theorists and philosophers have been grappling with the idea that moral values can irreconcilably conflict with one another, not only between competing value systems, but also within the conscience of an individual. 10 This idea has led to an enormous volume of writing trying to assess and extend Berlin's insight. 11 Two great questions have motivated this research. (1) Are values plural in the way that Berlin suggests? (2) Does value plurality lead to, reveal, or require as a response some substantive normative duty (for example, Berlin's suggestion that plurality reveals an obligation to respect negative liberty), or does it lead to moral relativism (a situation in which we lack a principled reason to judge any value or system of values as morally better or worse than any other)?
There are two general strategies for trying to answer the first of these questions, as to whether values can be plural. Realist pluralists argue that values are real, humanindependent (at least to some degree) facts about the universe, and that there are many such values that can come into irreconcilable conflict with each other because they do not have any intrinsic rank order. Isaiah Berlin, John Gray and William Galston all take this position. 12 Irrealist pluralists argue that values are not real things in the humanindependent universe -that they are, for example, contingent and context-relative cultural beliefs or habits -but that they can nonetheless come into (practically) irresolvable conflict with each other. These conflicts, which amount to an inability to rank the various values, arise precisely from their contingency and relativity -there is no objective ranking criterion available. Irrealism of this kind is famously associated with Nietzsche ,13 and Richard Rorty adopts a similar position. 14 There is an extensive literature on realist pluralism, with one side arguing that the fact of value plurality itself demonstrates, reveals, or leads to some kind of normative duty (to toleration, to encouraging plurality of lifestyles, to peaceful coexistence), and with the other side arguing that value plurality is morally neutral, neither endorsing nor undermining any substantive value orientation. 15 In this article I will examine irrealist pluralism, which is often quickly passed by in the current literature.
Many readers of Wittgenstein interpret him as giving an explanation of meaning and
knowledge that is very close to irrealist pluralism. On this 'conventionalist' reading, meaning and knowledge are both cultural constructs, relative to a particular 'form of life'. Because there is no Archimedean point, no position from which we can evaluate how well our ideas map onto the real world that we presume to exist independent of our concepts, we are permanently incapable of ascertaining the adequacy or ultimate 'truth' of our descriptions and claims. Rather, whatever evaluations we make of The main line of dispute is whether the theories laid out in the earlier and later works are profoundly similar or profoundly different. Here, too, I make no claim to resolving this controversy or even to adding anything to it. In this article, I will present the two theories as being significantly different, for two reasons: first, the theories present themselves that way to me, though I acknowledge that there are many similarities between the earlier and the later work; second, because emphasizing the differences between the theories makes it easier to explicate the later theory quickly for non-specialists.
In his early Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein starts from the premise that, for language to be meaningful, it must have definite reference -it must unproblematically refer to identifiable features of the world of experience. In other words, for meaning to be clear, it must somehow be possible to match up word and world. 16 For this to be possible, Wittgenstein reasoned, the world and the language that depicts it must share essentially the same structure - However, a central focus of the Tractatus is the contention that this connection between word and world is a transcendental premise. Because we cannot separate ourselves from our concepts to evaluate how well they match up to the world, it is impossible to evaluate or prove whether our words accurately reflect the real. Wittgenstein's argument in the Tractatus is that a close correspondence between word and world is a condition of possibility for language to function at all, but is not and cannot be a hypothesis, or even a meaningful proposition (since it purports to make a claim that it is logically impossible to investigate or evaluate).
Much of his later work is dedicated to undermining these early arguments. Take first the idea that the world must be made up of discrete things -atomic simples -in roughly the way that a proposition is made up of discrete subjects and qualifiers held together by a predicate. This theory of language and meaning points to a theory of justification that is broadly contextualist. 31 When I want to justify a knowledge-claim to you I offer reasons rooted in our In On Certainty Wittgenstein deepens this argument by maintaining that all justification necessarily takes place within a system of beliefs and practices (i.e. a form of life). Such a system must, if justification is to come to an end (that is, succeed), rest on some ultimate grounds -some beliefs or practices that are the final criteria of truth and falsity. Yet those final criteria cannot themselves be either true or false, since there is nothing against which to evaluate them. 33 Our world picture may change over time, 34 but its fundaments at any one time are not likely to be open to evaluation. Similarly, we come by our world picture not piece by piece, and not through satisfying ourselves of its truth, but rather all at once, as the world.
'When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole. Wittgenstein took essentially the same line in his middle-period 'Lecture on Ethics'. He continues to think that normative language has no meaning, but he seems to have a new appreciation of how very difficult it would be to stop using it. He writes:
I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language. My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. 38 But the theory of meaning in the Investigations leads to a different conclusion. In both the Tractatus and the 'Lecture', Wittgenstein is still working from the idea that meaning must be referential -that the words get their meaning by referring to some identifiable thing. But in the Investigations he abandons that view in favor of the idea that words get their meaning from how they are used -from their place in a form of life. On that view, words like 'God', 'right', 'wrong' and so on have as much meaning as words like 'hammer', 'squirrel' and 'molecule', and for the same reasons.
The theory of justification developed in On Certainty also extends to normative concepts.
Propositions like 'God is good', or 'Murder is wrong', can be true or false in exactly the same way as propositions like 'The squirrel is asleep on the roof'and 'The glass is filled with molecules of water'. What makes a proposition like 'Murder is wrong' meaningful to you and me is that it plays a part in our shared form of life. What makes it true or false similarly depends on our form of life. For example, for some people, the existence of the world is itself conclusive evidence for the existence of a creator god, while for people in a different form of life, it is not. Wittgenstein's theory does not (and cannot) tell us which view to take on this question, though it does help explain why people can disagree so drastically. Wittgenstein's critical reflection on rules offers a position from which it becomes possible both to question the assumptions of regularity and fixity that underlie typical practices of calculation and legislation, and to criticize these practices themselves on that basis. When, in particular, large sectors of social practice and prevailing institutions become governed by deeply held assumptions of regularity and uniformity, such a critical reflection on the sources of these assumptions becomes particularly important. 51 Pohlhaus and Wright's argument rests on the idea that if the skeptic or the critic is also part of the 'we' that defines what 'we' say, then refusing to listen or pretending that their claims are nonsense is not only unjust to them, but also undermines our own identities and our understanding of our own ideas. (As, for example, a scientist who refuses to examine empirical data that undermines his favorite theory is himself undermining it by taking it out of the realm of science (the empirically verifiable) and moving it to the realm of First, it assumes that forms of life are internally consistent and homogeneous, so that every member will always respond to the same problem in the same way. 62 Second, it assumes that forms of life are hermetically sealed off from one another, such that there can be no meaningful cross-cultural influence or exchange. Not only are both assumptions implausible as factual claims, they are both flatly contradicted by Wittgenstein's writing.
The theory of the Philosophical Investigations -in particular the arguments about family resemblance and following a rule -seems to suggest that a form of life is a loose assemblage of language-games and social practices that are related in a variety of ways. It seems not only possible but likely that there will be internal contradictions within a form of life, languagegames whose implications contradict other language-games, institutions that conflict with institutions, and so on. Even if it were true that there is a conservative tendency inherent in rooting meaning and knowledge in language-games and social practices, it seems that the very same process is likely to give rise to conflicts and competing interpretations within a single Wittgenstein as a post-Kantian, or perhaps as a retro-Pyrrhonian, whose contribution is to help us grasp that we cannot know whether our words or our ideas are true in the deep sense of being necessary or connected to thought-independent reality. Given that position, debates about moral truth (like other kinds of truth) simply become pointless -they are irresolvable, and thus neither the dogmatist nor the skeptic can win. Rather than continuing a fruitless debate, Rorty suggests that we change the topic, and talk about something else (like social policy). Implicit in that position is the assumption that we will continue on with whatever concrete words and ideas we happen to have already. 65 On this reading, Rorty's view is much closer to that of the 'neutral' readers of Wittgenstein, whose general position, I argue below, is largely correct.
Not surprisingly, most of those who really do read Wittgenstein as a relativist tend to conclude that he must therefore be a nihilist. They argue that, since a commitment to one's own form of life appears to be a condition of making meaning, and since the same must be true of those in other forms of life, there is apparently no way to evaluate forms of life from the outside: 'Remember that Wittgenstein said that "forms of life" were a kind of ultimate data beyond the reach of questioning. My form of life, right or wrong.' 66
Instead, we are condemned to saying that every form of life is correct in its own terms, and that no meaningful criticism of a form of life can be made from outside that form of life itself. As Ernest Gellner puts the point: 'When, however, this leveling out, this relativism, is articulated in terms of entire cultures, it then places a cognitively cumulative culture on the very same level as stagnant and self-revering ones.' 67
The charge of relativism, and thus of nihilism, is the oldest and most persistent criticism of conventionalist theories. The criticism that contextual or relativistic theories of morality lead to nihilism is really two related but distinct claims. The first is the idea that impossible. This is the basis of Gellner's criticism of Wittgenstein above. The second aspect of the charge that contextual theories of morality lead to nihilism is the idea that recognizing the relativity of our moral beliefs will slowly sap our willingness to act in accordance with them. Once we lose the idea that certain moral duties are universal obligations, and instead come to believe that they are merely contingent and contextrelative ways of life, some combination of selfishness, ignorance and apathy will lead us either into brutality or into a numb mediocrity. This is the kind of nihilism of which Nietzsche was so very afraid, though he thought that we were much more likely to end up in mediocrity than in brutality (which would have at least shown some spirit). 68 The Wittgensteinian response to the first charge -that acknowledging the relativity of values will make normative judgment logically impossible -is roughly the same as the response to profound skepticism. On the one hand, the recognition that our beliefs are relative does not do away with the human and social needs that those beliefs addressed. On the other hand, forms of life are never logically consistent systems but are rather sedimentary accretions of habits, practices, games, mistakes, misunderstandings, and so on.
Just as recognizing our inability to know whether our perceptions are accurate or our knowledge true does not make it either necessary or possible for us to do away with them, so, too, recognizing that our beliefs are contingent does not make it necessary or possible for us to discard them. The second charge of nihilism -that acknowledging the contingency of our values will sap our will to obey them -is harder to respond to. In essence, it is a claim about human nature -that human beings are not capable of exercising self-control, or of motivating themselves to take actions against their inclinations (towards selfishness, sloth, etc.)
without believing in the existence of moral obligations that transcend mere habit, common sense, tradition, and so on. This is a question of whether we agree with Nietzsche, who believed that human beings could and should overcome the idea of there being absolute moral standards, or with Plato, who believed that genuine knowledge of the good was both possible and also essential to successful human life . 69 there is still an abundance of fundamental moral struggle, and no promise that easy answers, or any at all, will be forthcoming. ' 71 It seems clear that Wittgenstein believed that there was tremendous value in being aware of one's language-games, and in avoiding being trapped by the implications of any particular region of grammar. This is not to say that Wittgenstein thought that we needed to develop a thoroughgoing critical analysis of our forms of life. As James Tully has argued, such a comprehensive critical grounding is neither necessary nor possible. 72
Rather, the goal is to strike the difficult balance between the inescapable necessity of having and acting on beliefs and the intellectual rigor and flexibility that come from never believing that things must be as we currently think they are.
On this reading, I make my normative choices based on my form of life. Since language and meaning are rooted in family resemblance and social convention, it seems possible and perhaps even likely that my form of life will contain internal contradictions and currents of self-criticism. 73 Thus, my form of life will be a source of both certainty and ongoing critical reflection. A permanent danger is that I will become captured by some part of my language-games and come to believe that things must be one way, ignoring the contradictory evidence from elsewhere in my form of life. A primary purpose of 
Conclusion: pluralism
How does all of this now relate back to pluralism? Remember that the concern of the value pluralists is how we can live together despite the fact that we appear to have value systems that are incompatible, in the sense that they cannot be put into place simultaneously, and incommensurable, in the sense that we have no way to decide which system is the best. If we are committed to avoiding chaos (the inability to make laws and policies due to disagreement) and also to avoiding oppression (a situation in which someone is forced to obey laws that he or she rejects as immoral and unjust), the plurality of value judgments appears to pose a grave problem for social cooperation.
Remember that in this article I am particularly concerned with irrealist value pluralism.
If we come to believe empirical value disagreement is caused by the fact that moral values are in fact irreal, in the sense that they are contingent and context-relative, does that recognition do anything to help us deal with the problems of pluralism? Our assessment of the literature on the political implications of the conventionalist reading of Wittgenstein helps us see that the answer must be no. The fact of irrealist pluralism does not reveal a duty to toleration or egalitarianism because such duties are relative to forms of life, and there is no reason to believe that every form of life does or will contain them. Nor does the fact of pluralism reveal that we must all be Burkean conservatives, since moral irrealism, and the conventionalism implied by it, does not necessarily mean that forms of life are monolithic or hermetically sealed off from each other. To the extent that forms of life are internally complex and conflictual, and to the extent that they overlap and interpenetrate each other, their commands about how to live will be multiple and changeable. Finally, irrealist pluralism does not necessarily lead to nihilism, since my moral beliefs are not simply ornaments that I may discard at will. To the extent that they are constitutive of my personality and my understanding of the world, I will continue to be influenced by them even if I wholeheartedly accept that they are merely contingent and context-relative.
However, just as Wittgenstein did not resolve the question of whether human nature is such that this kind of contextual relativism will slowly sap our moral wills, so too irrealist pluralism cannot put this doubt to rest. The truth about that question remains unknown.
Thus, working through the normative and political implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy helps us grasp the implications of irrealist pluralism: by itself, it apparently has none. Coming to believe that value is plural because it is context-relative has no particular consequences: we are merely left to make our way as best we can using our existing normative and political resources. Given limitations of space, I cannot discuss beyond a quick sketch how we might respond to the challenges of this value pluralism. It seems obvious that pluralism leaves open to us some avenues of cooperation. To the extent that individuals or ways of life contingently share some (or many) values, they will be able to cooperate on the basis of moral principle. Societies and individuals who do not find themselves in such substantive agreement would be able to pursue a Hobbesian modus vivendi -cooperation inspired by each participant's self-interest. Some societies would probably combine these two strategies, seeking principled agreement in some areas and a cooperation born of enlightened self-interest in others. With luck, perhaps those thin bases of cooperation could be modified or strengthened over time, by the creation of interpersonal and cultural ties, the emergence of institutions that many people value for different reasons, or a change in people's views due to a gradual convergence born of mutual respect. Thus, instead of the traditional philosophical goal of political cooperation bounded by moral obligations that all rational actors must acknowledge and obey, and instead of a mere Hobbesian ceasefire among mutually hostile parties, we could achieve a kind of layered pluralism, in which individuals and societies cooperate in a wide variety of ways, for a variety of reasons, some resting on moral duties, others on support for institutions, and yet others on various kinds of self-interest. There is much to be dissatisfied with in such a vision of politics, but that may be the world in which we find ourselves. Thus, for irrealist value pluralism to be possible, there must be situations in which people who all recognize that they are talking about moral values, and each of whom recognizes the others' beliefs as moral values, are nonetheless unable to reach agreement about how to rank those values. At the same time, it would be wrong to say that these situations prove or even suggest that this inability to rank the various values is or must be permanent. Surely Silver is correct that, given the right circumstances, they could be resolved. That said, we can easily imagine situations in which prolonged efforts have failed to bring about agreement, and in which the changes that would make agreement possible seem so profound and unlikely that we would be justified in saying that the dispute is, for all practical purposes, currently irresolvable. While there is some danger of misunderstanding here, there is also a danger in Silver's position of mistaking the mere possibility of a reconciliation for the reasonableness of expecting one.
40. See Crary and Read, The New Wittgenstein.
